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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 870399-CA 
v. t 
JESSIE JIMINEZ# : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Is defendant entitled to a rehearing even if this Court 
assumes that a videotape existed where there was no showing that 
there was evidence vital to the defense on that tape and there 
are live witnesses available to testify to the facts of the 
alleged assault? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with assault by a prisoner 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1978) for an 
incident occurring on March 14, 1987 in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. Judge Frank Noel dismissed the charge on defendant's 
motion on September 9, 1987. The State appealed and this Court 
reversed Judge Noel's dismissal. Defendant has now petitioned 
for rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The pertinent facts are contained in the original 
appellant's brief. The State disagrees with some of the fact 
allegations made by defendant in the rehearing petition. These 
are: 
1. MAt a hearing in Circuit Court prior to June 11, 
1987, the date on which the preliminary hearing in the instant 
case was held, the prosecutor informed defense counsel that a 
videotape of the incident existed." (Reh. Pet. at 2). Defendant 
states that this is a fact even though she admits in a footnote 
that there is nothing in the record to support this allegation. 
2. "The State was not prepared to argue the motion, 
and the trial court continued the hearing to August 7 and ordered 
the State to respond specifically as to whether a videotape 
capturing the incident had been made, what was on that tape, 
whether the tape had been destroyed and how." (Reh. Pet. at 2). 
Defendant provides no record citation for these allegations 
because there is nothing in the record to support the allegation. 
3. Twice defendant states that a "substitute 
prosecutor who was unfamiliar with the case" appeared at hearings 
(Reh. Pet. at 2). While the State acknowledges that the minute 
entries indicate that other prosecutors appeared on these dates, 
there is nothing in the record to support the allegation that 
these persons were unfamiliar with the case. 
Other than these three items, the State agrees with 
defendant's statement of the facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Even if this Court assumes the existence of a 
videotape, defendant is not entitled to a rehearing because 
defendant never demonstrated that any evidence on that tape was 
material in the constitutional sense. As this Court stated in 
the opinion, because defendant offered no evidence of what the 
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videotape showed, no one knows whether there was any evidence 
that was vital to the defense that was destroyed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REHEARING 
BECAUSE, EVEN IF A VIDEOTAPE EXISTED, THERE 
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
MATERIALITY. 
Defendant asserts that this Court misapprehended facts 
and law in this case in reversing the trial court's order and 
that this Court should, therefore, grant a rehearing. 
Specifically, she complains of this Court's finding that 
defendant never presented any evidence that there was a videotape 
that depicted the alleged assault. Defendant, however, misses 
the thrust of this Court's ruling and, as argued below, defendant 
is not entitled to a rehearing. 
The crux of this Court's ruling in this case is that, 
to support dismissal, defendant was required to show that the 
alleged videotape contained evidence that was material in the 
constitutional sense. To be constitutionally material, the 
evidence that was destroyed must be vital to defendant's guilt or 
innocence. The possibility that the information might have 
helped defendant is not sufficient to establish materiality. 
Slip op. at 3. Defendant focuses on whether in fact there was a 
videotape and ignores the meaning of this language, which is 
that, even if there was a videotape, defendant did not establish 
that it contained anything vital to her defense. 
As argued in the State's initial brief, there remain 
live witnesses to this alleged offense who are available to 
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testify at trial. It will be up to the jury to decide the 
credibility of those witnesses after they are subjected to cross-
examination on the issue of whether an assault occurred. Where 
there are live witnesses to testify to the events, the tape 
cannot be material in the absence of evidence that there was 
something on the tape bearing on the issue of guilt. See State 
v. Perez, 687 P.2d 1214, 1219 (Ariz. 1984) and other cases cited 
at page 5 of Appellant's Brief. 
Defendant argues that this Court must assume that there 
was evidence before the trial court that there was something 
material on the tape. She asserts that the State is attempting 
to circumvent this finding by purposely not ordering a transcript 
of the arguments on the motion. She also complains for the first 
time on rehearing, that the order drafted by the State was 
purposely drafted to avoid meaningful review. These allegations 
are unfounded and do not go to the heart of the issues before 
this Court. 
It would not be logical for this Court to assume that 
there was evidence before the lower court supporting a finding 
that there was something material on any tape that had existed 
for three reasons. First, the record does not indicate that 
there was an evidentiary hearing. If the court never took 
evidence, then no one established anything about the content of 
any tape. 
Second, it is clear from the record that neither the 
prosecutor nor defense counsel viewed the tape before it was 
destroyed because defendant did not request the tape until July 
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2, 1987 (R. 21) and the record shows that the tape of that day's 
bookings was destroyed by March 17, 1987 (72 hours after the date 
of the offense, see R. 17, 28). 
Third, the trial court's order does not support 
defendant'8 claim that the court found that a constitutionally 
material tape existed because the order states that "any" tape of 
the incident was destroyed (R. 41). The use of the word any 
belies a finding that there was actually a videotape containing 
constitutionally material evidence. Defendant points out that 
her attorney did not approve this order as to form, and claims, 
therefore, that it was "artfully drafted" to omit findings by the 
trial court. It is rational, however, that if the trial court 
had made the significant finding that the tape was 
constitutionally material in the sense that it contained 
something vital to defendant, the court would have amended the 
language of the order or refused to sign it. It is also 
interesting to note that defendant did not object to the form of 
the order at any time prior to the rehearing petition. While 
defendant could not reasonably have been expected to object prior 
to the Judge signing the order, since it was mailed to defense 
counsel on Sept. 9, 1987 and the Judge signed it on that same 
date, defendant could have interposed a later objection but did 
not. Defendant should not be allowed for the first time on 
rehearing to assert that the record is incorrect where defendant 
had earlier opportunities to bring any deficiency to the trial 
court's attention. 
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Defendant also claims that the prosecutor told defense 
counsel at a hearing in circuit court prior to the preliminary 
hearing that there was a videotape of the incident. There is 
nothing in the record to support this allegation, but defendant 
argues that this is because the State failed to order transcripts 
of the hearings in this case. Defendant does not indicate, 
however, that this alleged representation was on the record and 
defendant never asserted that such a representation had been made 
in the initial briefing of this case. Clearly, such a 
representation, if made, would lend some support to defendant's 
argument that a videotape existed even though the record later 
indicates that the prosecutor did not know if any videotape 
captured the alleged assault (R. 28, 32). However, at no time 
does either party refer to this alleged representation in any of 
the written documents submitted to Judge No€*l and Judge Noel made 
no finding of this fact. There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that Judge Noel had before him this information or any 
information from the preliminary hearing at the time he dismissed 
the case. However, even if a transcript would establish that the 
prosecutor said a videotape existed, or this Court assumes that a 
videotape existed, the trial court's ruling was erroneous because 
there was no finding that the videotape was constitutionally 
material and there was no finding that a videotape capturing the 
incident existed because the judge only ruled that destruction of 
wanyM tape necessitated dismissal. 
Indeed, if defendant's factual assertions are to be 
accepted by this Court, the fact that the trial court ordered the 
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prosecutor to state whether there was a videotape and what was on 
it and the prosecutor responded that the videotape of all 
bookings was recycled 72 hours after the booking date (R. 28), 
supports the State's position that there was no evidence that the 
tape contained something material to defendant. Given the lack 
of findings of materiality, this Court must assume that there was 
no evidence presented on this issue. Bagnall v. Suburbia Land 
Co., 579 P.2d 917 (Utah 1978). Again, if defendant thought the 
trial court's order and lack of findings was not an accurate 
reflection of what occurred in the hearings on the motion, 
defendant could have objected to the order at some point prior to 
rehearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to deny the petition for rehearing because defendant fails to 
establish that this Court misapprehended relevant facts or law. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j^P^ day of November, 
1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
//SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
\s Assistant Attorney General 
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